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A Benign Prior Restraint Rule for Public School
Classroom Speech
Scott R. Bauries*

The classroom is perhaps the most vexing speech location in all of First
Amendment law. The doctrine of the First Amendment has generally
regarded the classroom as a nonpublic, or closed, forum for the purposes
of both student and teacher speech,1 but that same doctrine has developed
completely different sets of protection for these two categories of
speakers.2 The doctrine that has developed in the classroom goes beyond
the doctrine that normally governs other closed or nonpublic forums,
where at least viewpoint discrimination is not generally permitted.3
The law of the classroom allows for restrictions on the speech—both its
content and its viewpoint—of both teachers and students. Whether, and
how, these restrictions apply depends in both cases on an initial
* Scott R. Bauries is the Robert G. Lawson Associate Professor of Law at the University
of Kentucky. His scholarship focuses on constitutional law and employment law in
educational contexts.
1
There is, of course, a substantial amount of dispute over this question. See, e.g., Alan
Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category: Bringing Order out of the
Chaos of Free-Speech Cases Involving School-Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 717 (2009) (recognizing, but rejecting, the characterization and arguing for the
alternative of the “nonforum” for the classroom and the overall school); Alexis Zouhary,
The Elephant in the Classroom: A Proposed Framework for Applying Viewpoint
Neutrality to Student Speech in the Secondary School Setting, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2227 (2007-2008) (making the point that both schools and school classrooms are
generally considered to be closed forums). For the purposes of this brief article, I do not
attempt to resolve these disputes. Rather, I fit the Garcetti, Tinker, and Hazelwood
decisions into their natural forum categories, with Garcetti and Hazelwood representing
closed forums and Tinker, due to its protections against both content and viewpoint
discrimination, representing a limited public forum, limited to certain participants
(students).
2
See infra, sections on teachers and students as speakers under the First Amendment.
3
See, e.g., Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach to
Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 66 (2008) (stating that the
“question is not whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint discrimination, but when”)
(emphasis in original); Brownstein, supra note 1 at 722 (“In a nonpublic forum,
viewpoint-discriminatory speech regulations receive strict scrutiny while content-neutral
and content-discriminatory regulations are evaluated under a lenient reasonableness
standard of review”).
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categorical determination of whether the speech occurred as part of a
classroom or co-curricular lesson or activity. For student speech, if this is
so, then Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier treats the speech as
having occurred in a closed forum, allowing for regulation of both its
content and viewpoint based on “legitimate pedagogical concerns.” 4 For
teacher speech, if this is so, then Garcetti v. Ceballos leaves the speech
completely outside the reach of the First Amendment, regardless of its
content or viewpoint.5 Put another way, the categorical determination that
speech occurred in the classroom or in a co-curricular activity leads to
strong deference to the school in the case of student speech, and total
deference to the school in the case of teacher speech.
Neither system of protections (or the lack thereof) adequately respects
the individual expressive interests that animate the educational process,
nor do they seriously engage with the inherently expressive and
discretionary nature of the educational process, and neither will be able to
be perfected any time soon.6 But the unfairness inherent in both sets of
doctrine could be mitigated through a slight adjustment—limiting their
application to prior restraints on speech. For speech that brings some sort
of punishment or consequence on the speaker after the fact, the First
Amendment has workable rules that are far superior to those that currently
govern such speech in the classroom. For speech that the government
wishes to suppress before it is made or published, however, the doctrines
governing both teacher and student speech pose no serious speech
autonomy or marketplace of ideas problems that are not outweighed by the
importance of effective and efficient operation of public schools for all.

4

484 U.S. 260 (1988).
547 U.S. 410 (2006).
6
E.g., Paul M. Secunda, Neoformalism and the Reemergence of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Employment Law, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 907, 912 (2011) (hereinafter,
Secunda, Right-Privilege); Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment
Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117, 123 (2008)
(hereinafter, Secunda, Federal Employees) (“Consistent with Justice Stevens’ dissent in
Garcetti, I reject the dichotomous, overly-formalistic view of a public employee as either
being a citizen or worker, but never simultaneously both.”); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes,
Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1174, 1192 (2007) (criticizing the unthinking formalism of
Garcetti); Scott Andrew Felder, Stop the Presses: Censorship and the High School
Journalist, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 433, 446-48 (2000) (criticizing the Hazelwood test as vague
and overbroad); S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three Rs—Repression, Rights,
and Respect: A Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 119, 137 (1995)
(criticizing the Hazelwood test as standardless).
5
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Accordingly, this Article advances the claim that the First Amendment
doctrines that apply to the classroom should adopt a benign prior restraint
rule.7 In the case of teacher classroom speech, the Garcetti rule should
apply where the government’s action in interfering with the speech
constitutes a prior restraint—the First Amendment should not reach such
interference. In cases where a teacher first speaks and then is later
punished for that speech, however, basic notions of due process and the
dangers of arbitrary governmental decision making are far more pressing,
and the Pickering8 balance should be applied.
In the case of student speech, the Hazelwood rule is well-suited to the
prior restraint of classroom speech because it encourages the government
to lay out its legitimate pedagogical justifications for restraint in advance.
But as with teacher speech, punishing student speech only after it is made
or published gives rise to significant autonomy interests, due process
interests, and marketplace of ideas concerns. Thus, this sort of
interference should have to contend with the more demanding standard
articulated in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District.9
As this Article will show, this proposed rule distinguishing between
prior restraints and later punishments is not a far step from either the
Garcetti decision or the Hazelwood decision. Working within the
categorical structure of the existing cases, it would also introduce a
meaningful limit on the tendency of government administrators (and
sometimes teachers) to act arbitrarily against ideas that they themselves
disfavor, or more importantly, that powerful voices in the community
disfavor.

7

I refer to this proposed rule as “benign” to distinguish it from the traditional idea of the
public censor on publishers as a prior restraint, which gave rise to the First Amendment’s
speech protections in the first place. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the
Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 57 (1984).
Setting up a prior restraint requirement as a way to better protect speech is, of course,
counter-intuitive, given this history, but it works because the entire doctrine of the First
Amendment as relates to public school classrooms is also counter-intuitive.
8
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
9
393 U.S. 503 (1969). Tinker allows regulation of student speech based on the less
deferential requirement of “material and substantial disrupt[ion]” of the learning
environment, a standard that applies to both content and viewpoint discrimination. Id. at
513-14.
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The Classroom and the First Amendment
It has been said many times by many observers that education is a
pervasively expressive activity.10 But the public school classroom is also,
paradoxically, a place of restricted expressive rights. 11 The reasons are
complex. Below, I elucidate them, beginning with the place of the
speech—the classroom—and then moving to the identities of the
speakers—the teachers and students.
As will become clear, the
justifications for reduced First Amendment protections for both teachers
and students are strong, but the current doctrine has privileged these
justifications too much, resulting in doctrine that is both unthinking and
needlessly detrimental to the discourse of the classroom.
The Classroom as a Speech Forum12
The Supreme Court has, over the years, developed a set of doctrinal
restrictions on the basic right of speakers to speak without interference
from the government. This basic right might be thought of as the right to
express oneself anywhere, anytime, in any manner, and on any topic,
completely free from restriction of any kind. It is plausible to say that,
under this baseline right, the Government’s sole role as to the expression
of individuals and legal entities is to remain completely disinterested. 13 I
10

See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 1, at 808 (“Regulating speech is fundamental to what
an educator does. Virtually every aspect of a teacher’s responsibilities involves the
direction and control of speech.”); Scott R. Bauries & Patrick Schach, Coloring Outside
the Lines: Garcetti v. Ceballos in the Federal Appellate Courts, 262 EDUC. L. REP. 357
(2011) (“As an inherently expressive enterprise, education requires its participants to
engage in speech and expressive conduct.”); JOHN TIFFIN & LALITA RAJASINGHAM, IN
SEARCH OF THE VIRTUAL CLASS: EDUCATION IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 19-47 (1995)
(describing education as a system of communication with inter-connected networks and
sub-networks).
11
See, e.g., Settle v. Dickson County School Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155 (6th Cir. 1995)
(“Where learning is the focus, as in the classroom, student speech may be even more
circumscribed than in the school newspaper or other open forum”).
12
This section derives substantially from an earlier work of mine laying the same
foundation. See Scott R. Bauries, Academic Freedom: An Ordinary Concern of the First
Amendment, 83 MISS. L.J. 677 (2014). For ease of reading, quotation marks and block
quotations of this work have been avoided.
13
As any student of the First Amendment would quickly realize, this “baseline right” is
purely hypothetical because the doctrine of the First Amendment consists entirely of
limitations on it, and has since the beginning. See, e.g., Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) (“[T]he First Amendment does
not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any
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have in the past described the principle that governs this baseline role as
the “neutrality principle.”14 The Supreme Court’s most recent full
articulation of this principle came in the majority’s opinion in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission:15
Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First
Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or
viewpoints.16 Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among
different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.17 As
instruments to censor, these categories are interrelated: Speech
restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often
simply a means to control content.18
The neutrality principle is the bedrock of all First Amendment
protection.19 Governmental discrimination against speakers with
particular viewpoints on favored topics, or against all speakers on
disfavored topics, or against particular speakers or classes of speakers
manner that may be desired”); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
Nevertheless, it is necessary to begin by deconstructing these limitations to reveal what
they limit, and then to continue by reconstructing the limits, that we might better
understand where each fits within the First Amendment superstructure.
14
Bauries, supra note 12, at 730. I derived this principle from the seminal work of
Kenneth Karst elucidating what he termed the “principle of equality.” See generally
Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 20 (1975).
15
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
16
Id. at 312 (citing United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813
(2000)).
17
Id. at 312-13 (citing First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)).
18
Id. at 340-41; see also Darrel C. Menthe, The Marketplace Metaphor and Commercial
Speech Doctrine: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying About and Love Citizens United,
38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 131, 133 (2010) (“Citizens United radically affirmed the
principle that the First Amendment must be neutral as between different speakers,
holding that even corporate speech (at least on political matters) is fully protected by the
First Amendment and cannot be subject to increased regulation merely because of its
corporate authorship”).
19
See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L.
REV. 695, 706 (2011); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1304-05 (2006); Frederick Schauer,
Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1270 (2005); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems
in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 50 (2000); Elena Kagan,
Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996); see also Karst, supra note 15, at 35.
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regardless of topic, all presumptively violate the First Amendment.20
But in practice, a strict neutrality principle is difficult to uphold in
every case, or even in most cases. Under the baseline expressive right and
the baseline responsibility of government to remain completely
disinterested in expression, the potential problems become obvious. The
classic objection asks what we should do when someone shouts “Fire!” in
a crowded theater, causing a panic and possibly injury and death. 21 Other
classical critiques ask what we should do about speech that falsely
defames the reputation of another, or speech that defrauds, or speech that
puts another in reasonable fear for his life or safety. These questions and
many others have caused the doctrine of the First Amendment to develop
mostly as a set of limitations on the baseline right to speak however,
whenever, and wherever one pleases, expressing whatever viewpoint one
has on whatever topic one might choose to address. Indeed, it is plausible
to say that the baseline right is largely hypothetical, and it is the
limitations on this hypothetical basic right that make up the entire doctrine
of the First Amendment.
These doctrines of limitations in expressive rights break down under
three analytical categories—content-based exemptions, government role
analysis, and forum analysis.
Content-based Exemptions
The simplest of these doctrines of limitation are the various contentbased categorical exemptions from First Amendment protection that the
courts have constructed over time.22 Harry Kalven referred to the theory
underlying these exemptions as the “two-level theory,” owing to the fact
that exemptions are typically created due to a determination by the Court
20

See Karst, supra note 14, at 40 (criticizing Alexander Meiklejohn’s value-based theory
of the First Amendment and stating, “A vital public forum requires a principle of equal
liberty of expression that is broad, protecting speakers as well as ideas”). This
presumptive protection can be overcome, but the government must meet a very
demanding burden to overcome it. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech,
Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2417
n.1 (1996) (introducing the general rule that content- or viewpoint-based restrictions
imposed on speech by the government, acting in its sovereign capacity, must overcome
strict scrutiny).
21
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (opinion of Holmes, J., for the Court)
(“The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting
fire in a theater and causing a panic”).
22
See Bauries & Schach, supra note 10, at n.5 (collecting cases establishing the various
low-value speech exceptions).
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that the exempted content constitutes “low-value” speech.23 These
exemptions today include such speech categories as “true threats,”24
“obscenity,”25 “fighting words,”26 “incitement of imminent lawless
activity,”27 and several others.28
These categories of speech content have been judicially deemed to be
of such low value to the public discourse that they qualify for reduced, or
even no, First Amendment protection. Inside schools, the categories
apply, but courts do not often find it necessary to discuss them due to the
other standards that apply to all speech in schools, as discussed below.
Government Role Analysis
Government role analysis asks what role the government occupies
toward a speaker when it acts to suppress or punish that speaker’s speech.
Familiar roles that the Court has recognized include government-asemployer; government-as-patron; government-as-proprietor; and more
recently, government-as-speaker.29 Each of these roles entitles the
government’s interests to greater initial weight in an ex ante balancing of
interests than these interests would receive in some cases if ex post
balancing were used.
For example, when the government acts as a patron of the arts, which it
does primarily through the funding of grants, it must have the power to
discriminate between works of art or proposed works of art as to their
quality.30 Arts funding is limited, and it does not serve the public interest
to fund art projects that are of low quality or impact. But in order to direct
23

Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10
(1960).
24
E.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
25
E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S 15 (1973).
26
E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
27
E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
28
See Bauries & Schach, supra note 10.
29
See, e.g., Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First
Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945, 989
(2009) (proposing a new category for government role analysis, “government-aseducator,” based on ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY,
COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 199–267 (1995)); Blocher, supra note 19 (arguing that
government speech secures a governmental right to discriminate based on viewpoint
when it is the speaker).
30
See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 61 (2013) (describing arts
funding as one of the “snares” inherent in an “acontextual” approach to the First
Amendment).

94

Volume 2

Education Law & Policy Review

2015

limited public funding to projects of high value, the government must
make a determination—one based on content—as to which of two
competing works or proposed works is of higher quality.31
One government role that has particular significance to the issues
discussed in this Article is the role of “government-as-employer.”32 When
the government acts as an employer, it must maintain a certain level of
control over its workplace, both to protect the quality of the services it
offers to the public and to ensure that its employees do not violate the
rights of private individuals. When the government is an employer in
certain of its workplaces, it inevitably employs people, such as attorneys,
teachers, professors, and press secretaries, who “speak” for a living.
Pickering v. Board of Education,33 the leading case on public employee
speech rights, illustrates the case-by-case approach. In Pickering, a local
Board of Education dismissed a teacher after he sent a letter to a
newspaper criticizing the Board’s prior handling of proposals to increase
the Board’s revenues.34 The Board determined that the letter was
“detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the schools of
the district” and that these interests justified his dismissal.35 The Court
held the dismissal unconstitutional, holding that, absent substantial
justification, “a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public
importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public
employment.”36 The Court engaged in a balancing of the interests of the
Board as an employer and the interests of Mr. Pickering as a participant in
public debate. The Court ultimately concluded that the Board could state
no interest sufficient to overcome the interest of Mr. Pickering in
participating as an ordinary citizen in an important public discussion.
In 1983, the Supreme Court modified Pickering through its decision in
Connick v. Myers,37 holding that a public employee’s internal
questionnaire, circulated among her co-employees, was unprotected
31

See Nat’l Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587-88 (1998) (“Finally,
although the First Amendment certainly has application in the subsidy context, we note
that the Government may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would be
impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at stake”).
32
See, e.g., Areen, supra note 30, at 990-91 (describing this role).
33
391 U.S. 563 (1968). For a thoughtful summary of the pre-Garcetti jurisprudence,
beginning with Pickering, see Robert M. O’Neil, Academic Speech in the Post-Garcetti
Environment, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1 (2008).
34
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
35
Id. at 564-565 (citations omitted).
36
Id. at 574.
37
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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speech, due to its nature as a personal employee grievance, rather than a
matter of public concern, and also due to its negative impact on office
operations and efficiency.38 After Connick, a court facing a First
Amendment retaliation claim is required to engage in a threshold inquiry,
which requires the court, prior to engaging in the Pickering balancing test,
to first ascertain whether the employee’s speech addressed a matter of
public concern.39 If the answer to this question is “no,” then the speech is
unprotected.40 If the answer is “yes,” then the court proceeds to the
Pickering balancing test, but this threshold determination of public
concern precedes the Pickering test in all cases.41
Following Pickering and Connick, the Court entertained few public
employee First Amendment retaliation claims. However, one significant
pre-Connick case, Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District,42
further clarified that neither the place nor the target of the speech in
question is dispositive when determining whether the speech is protected.
In Givhan, the Court held that an employee’s internal complaints to her
principal about possible race discrimination in personnel decisions at her
school site were protected speech.43 Thus, the fact that speech on a matter
of public concern is made while an employee is at work, to a superior, or
otherwise through internal channels (rather than through a public
medium), does not render the speech unprotected.
Most observers saw Connick as a tilting of the Pickering balance in
favor of employers,44 but the basic protection for public employee speech
remained.45 This was the state of public employee First Amendment law
when Chief Justice Roberts took the gavel—a general protection of the
speech of public employees on matters of public concern against
retaliation, subject to override where employer interests outweigh the
38

Id. at 150-54.
Robert C. Cloud, Public Employee Speech on Matters Pursuant to their Official
Duties: Whistle While you Work?, 210 EDUC. L. REP. 855, 857-858 (2006).
40
Id. at 858.
41
Id. at 861.
42
439 U.S. 410 (1979).
43
Id. at 415-16.
44
See, e.g., Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech
on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 47-50 (1988).
45
Indeed, the Court added one more significant precedent a few years after Connick,
Rankin v. McPherson, recognizing an expansive definition of “matter of public concern.”
See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381, 385 (1987) (holding that a public
employee’s expression of hope that the failed shooters of President Reagan in 1981 “get
him” if they were to try again was speech on a matter of public concern).
39
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interests of the employee in speaking and the public in receiving the
message.
One of the Roberts Court’s earliest decisions, Garcetti v. Ceballos46
was what many consider to be a radical departure from the Pickering
regime, even as limited by Connick and Mt. Healthy. Like Connick,
Garcetti did not involve an academic employee. Ceballos, the plaintiff,
was a “calendar deputy” for the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office.47
Consistent with his responsibilities in this role, at the urging of defense
counsel in a pending case, Ceballos examined a search warrant that had
been obtained against the defense counsel’s client.48
Concluding that the affidavit supporting the warrant was plagued by
misrepresentations and serious factual inaccuracies, Ceballos authored a
memorandum to that effect and submitted it to his superiors.49 This
submission led to a heated discussion, and ultimately, Ceballos’s superiors
rejected the memorandum’s conclusions.50 Subsequently, defense counsel
called Ceballos as a witness in the suppression hearing, and Ceballos
testified substantially in concert with his memorandum, but the judge
denied the motion to suppress.51 Finally, when all was said and done,
Ceballos was transferred to a less desirable position.52
Ceballos filed suit claiming, among other things, retaliation for the
exercise of his First Amendment right to speak on matters of public
concern.53 When the case reached the Supreme Court, the only speech
that was at issue was Ceballos’s written memorandum to his superiors.54
The Court considered the memorandum in light of the Pickering line of
cases and concluded that it was not the kind of speech that the Pickering
line was designed to protect. Rather than “citizen speech,” Ceballos’s
memorandum was speech made “pursuant to [Ceballos’s] duties” as a
calendar deputy.55 The Court then stated as its holding a categorical rule
of exclusion from the First Amendment’s protection:

46

547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Id. at 413.
48
Id. at 413-15.
49
Id. at 414.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 415.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
See id. 420-26.
55
Id. at 415.
47
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We hold that when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from
employer discipline.56
The Garcetti Court’s choice to adopt a categorical rule excluding
certain speech from First Amendment protection has drawn fervent
criticism. Multiple legal commentators have critiqued the decision on the
grounds that it is unthinkingly formalistic.57 These critiques center upon
the Court’s adoption of a threshold categorical rule to precede, and in
some cases preclude, the interest balancing that would otherwise be
conducted in cases alleging First Amendment retaliation.58 Commentators
generally contend that a categorical rule is inappropriate in the context of
the First Amendment,59 and that any such rule is likely to render
56

Id. at 421.
See, e.g., Secunda, Right-Privilege, supra note 6, at 912; Secunda, Federal Employees,
supra note 6, at 123 (“Consistent with Justice Stevens’ dissent in Garcetti, I reject the
dichotomous, overly-formalistic view of a public employee as either being a citizen or
worker, but never simultaneously both.”); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee
Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1173, 1174, 1192 (2007).
58
Sources cited supra note 57.
59
Garcetti was not the first case in which the Supreme Court set down a categorical rule
creating an exemption from First Amendment scrutiny. Under the current understanding
of the First Amendment, there are several such exemptions, each of which describes a
category of speech that does not qualify for First Amendment protection. See, e.g.,
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (true threats); Miller v. California, 413 U.S 15
(1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting
words); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement to imminent lawless
activity); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation, including a modified,
but still categorical, exception if the subject is a public figure); see also New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography). But see Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (striking down portions of the federal statute
criminalizing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2256, as overly broad). In addition to these
categories, several speech-related acts have been criminalized or have formed the basis of
tort liability in the states with little resulting First Amendment scrutiny. See, e.g., ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1078-91 (4th ed. 2011)
(discussing defamation together with privacy torts and intentional infliction of emotional
distress). Professor Sheldon Nahmod has pointed out that each of these categories is
based on the content of the speech and its intrinsic value, rather than the identity of the
speaker, and that the Garcetti exemption presents a departure from traditional First
Amendment principles. Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical
Balancing, and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 57071 (2008).
57
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unprotected speech that ought to be protected, considering the purposes of
the First Amendment.60 This is a familiar critique of formalist rules, but
one commentator has pointed out that the decision is likely to lead to
results contrary even to the professed values of formalist judging—namely
the fostering of predictability and the cabining of the influence of ideology
in the judicial process.61 Indeed, many courts applying Garcetti have
over-read the case to deny First Amendment protection of any kind to
speech simply made during the course of a public employee’s
employment, or speech related to a public employee’s employment.62
These rulings have caused many to conclude that Garcetti was wrongly
decided,63 and have been used as support for more general critiques of the
formalism of the Roberts Court.64
The Pickering-Garcetti line of precedent recognizes that the
government must be able to exercise some control over the speech of its
employees who are hired to speak, and Garcetti held that the government
may exercise total control where the speech is made “pursuant to official
duties.”65 As is true in the context of categorical exemption from the First
Amendment’s protection, this line of precedent inherently lessens, and in
some cases completely eliminates, the government’s duty of neutrality
toward speech and speakers.
Another government role that is particularly important to this Article’s
analysis might best be described as “government as educator.”66 In its role
as the provider of public education to the vast majority of school-age
children in the country, the government may restrict the speech of students
60

See, e.g., Secunda, Federal Employees, supra note 6, at 118 (federal employee speech);
Rhodes, supra note 57, at 1201 n. 204 (academic speech); Sheldon H. Nahmod,
Academic Freedom and the Post-Garcetti Blues, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 54, 56 (2008)
(same); Helen Norton, Government Workers and Government Speech, 7 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 75, 90 (2008) (whistleblower/government auditor speech).
61
Rhodes, supra note 57, at 1193.
62
See Bauries & Schach, supra note 10 (documenting the broadening of the Garcetti
categorical exemption in lower court decision making).
63
Rhodes, supra note 57, at 1174; Secunda, Federal Employees, supra note 6, at 117;
Norton, supra note 60, at 83; Nahmod, supra note 60, at 54.
64
Secunda, Right-Privilege, supra note 6, at 911.
65
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
66
See generally Zouhary, supra note 1, at 2254-55 (explaining the speech-restrictive
privileges the government obtains when it steps into its role as educator). Judith Areen
uses this term to describe a proposed reconceptualization of state governments as higher
education providers. Areen, supra note 29. Here, I am using the term more broadly to
reflect the substantial body of case law that governs student speech in public schools and
classrooms.
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to protect its ability to accomplish its public duty to educate.67
For example, even the political speech of students may conceivably be
limited in schools if it causes or portends a material and substantial
disruption of the learning environment. This rule comes out of the
seminal case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District. 68 In Tinker, several students wore black armbands to protest the
Vietnam War, and they were punished as a result. Uttering those famous
words that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”69 the Supreme Court held
that student speech may be suppressed based on its content or viewpoint
only if such speech “materially and substantially disrupt[s] the work and
discipline of the school.”70
Based on Tinker and subsequent student speech decisions, the Court
permits school administrators to suppress speech in schools that is lewd or
outside the bounds of decorum.71 The Court has even approved a school
administration’s ability to limit student speech outside the physical limits
of the school grounds where it was evident to the Court that the speech
occurred at a “school sponsored function.”72 But these cases presented
scenarios that convinced the Court that disrupting the learning
environment was inevitable where speech conflicted with or urged the
rejection of school rules of behavior—a debatable case surely, but one
within the Tinker standard nonetheless. So, in most of their interactions
outside the classroom, students enjoy capacious, but not unlimited, First
Amendment protections, and administrators must steer widely around any
prohibitions on political or other speech based on its content or viewpoint
unless they can convincingly predict a material and substantial disruption
67

Zouhary, supra note 2, at 2254-55.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
69
Id. at 506.
70
Id. at 513-14. The Court also mentioned “colliding with the rights of others” as a
potential basis for suppression. Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F. 2d 744, 749
(5th Cir. 1966)). Many commentators, and some courts, have treated this concern as
being a “second prong” of the Tinker test, justifying speech suppression even where no
substantial disruption to learning happens or is reasonably predictable, if the speech in
question is found to “collide with the rights of others.” Whatever that vague phrase may
mean, there was no plausible argument in Tinker that the rights of other students were
being interfered with, and no Supreme Court case since has rested its approval of a
restriction of student speech on that ground, so the sometimes-alleged “second prong” of
Tinker was likely an aside or a way of restating the “substantial interference” rule, rather
than a separate dimension of the Court’s test.
71
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
72
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401-02 (2007).
68
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to the school environment.
As to speech within the classroom or in furtherance of co-curricular
activities such as student newspapers, a different set of rules applies. The
foundational case in this area, Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, held that public
school officials may censor student speech by removing certain items from
student newspapers published as part of school journalism classes,
provided that such removal or censoring is done to serve “legitimate
pedagogical concerns.”73 The Court justified this rule based in part on
forum analysis. The Court reasoned that, rather than being a designated
public forum for student expression, the school newspaper was part of the
school’s curriculum, and therefore was a closed or nonpublic forum, in
which speech could be subjected to restrictions reasonable in light of the
purposes of the forum.74
Because Hazelwood was decided in the context of the censoring of a
school newspaper, it is reasonable to ask what the case has to do with
student speech in the non-journalism class. However, the Court’s framing
of its holding makes clear that it was working under the assumption that
classroom speech could be restricted in the same way. Drawing a
connection between the co-curricular newspaper activity at issue in
Hazelwood and the classroom, the Court developed its “legitimate
pedagogical justification test” as uniquely suited to, and reasonable in
light of, the delivery of the school’s curriculum:
These activities may fairly be characterized as part of the
school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a
traditional classroom setting, so long as they are
supervised by faculty members and designed to impart
particular knowledge or skills to student participants and
audiences.75
So, the Court, assuming that speech made in the classroom would be part
of the school’s curriculum, then extended the analysis to activities which
might not occur in the classroom, but which would “carry the imprimatur
of the school.”76 By drawing this connection, the Court made it clear that
both the classroom and certain co-curricular activities carry with them the
73

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988).
Id. at 267 (citations omitted) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7, 47 (1983)).
75
Id. at 270.
76
Id. at 270-71.
74
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“imprimatur of the school,” and that speech can therefore be restricted in
both environments based on “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”77
Forum Analysis
Some of the roles the government may assume are straightforward,
while other roles have multiple levels of complexity. The greatest
complexity in the doctrine results when the government assumes the role
of the owner or manager of property, what we might term, “governmentas-proprietor.” In this role, the government, like any property owner or
controller, must sometimes exercise control over who may access a certain
piece of property and what such persons may do once on the property.
This necessity has spawned a truly byzantine web of doctrinal rules,
collectively placed under the label “forum analysis,” which determine the
extent to which government may suppress or control speech or speakers
on its own property, or on property within its control.
The basic distinctions break down into four categories of forums: the
traditional public forum, the designated public forum, the limited public
forum, and the closed or non-public forum. A traditional public forum is a
government-owned space, such as a public park, a beach, or a sidewalk,
which has traditionally been “held in trust for the public”78 and has been
freely used by speakers to proclaim things to the public.79 In such a
forum, no content or viewpoint discrimination is allowed unless the
77

See Waldman, supra note 4 (outlining the application of Hazelwood to student speech
in the classroom). Incidentally, Prof. Waldman’s article does an excellent job of
disentangling what was then a confusing web of applications of Hazelwood to all sorts of
speech, including the speech of teachers. As this Article demonstrates, Garcetti likely
subsumes any prior caselaw applying Hazelwood to teacher speech, so Prof. Waldman
was quite prescient in arguing for a return to Hazelwood as purely a student speech case,
as it is treated here. See Waldman, supra note 3.
78
See, e.g., Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (“Wherever
the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the
use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of
the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United
States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may
be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in
subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and
good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied”).
79
See Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1981 (2011) (explaining
the various forum categories that govern forum analysis, and the conceptual problems
with each).
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government can defend such a restriction as necessary to achieve a
compelling government interest, but the government may adopt reasonable
“time, place, and manner” restrictions, so long as such restrictions are
reasonable in light of the expressive interests of speakers and listeners.80
For a piece of government property to be a traditional public forum, it
must have been used by the public historically for the purpose of speech.81
For all other government property, the government has the baseline right
of exclusion that all property owners have. But the government can also
designate a piece of its property that has not traditionally been used for
speech as being open for that use. This latter type of forum is called a
“designated” or “open” forum, and it places the same restrictions on
government as the traditional public forum as to the regulation of speech
by its content or viewpoint.82
The other two categories grant the government more power to restrict
speech, and these categories are the most relevant to the topic of
classroom speech. Just as the government may designate a piece of its
property to be open to speech, it may also designate that property to be
open only for a particular category of speech topics or a particular class of
speakers. If so, then the forum is termed a “limited public forum.” 83 A
school board meeting, for example, might be designated a limited public
forum for discussion of property tax rates, or a publicly owned auditorium
might be designated a limited public forum for the presentation of
candidate debates for an upcoming election. Lyrissa Lidsky offers a
succinct explanation of the general rules that apply in this type of forum:
When the State decides to open a public forum but limits it
to certain speakers and topics, the State’s establishment of
forum parameters is constitutional, so long as the
parameters are reasonable and viewpoint neutral. When the
State applies the forum criteria and excludes a speaker
based on the subject matter of his speech, the exclusion
need only be “reasonable in light of the purposes served by
80

Id. at 1982. Of course, as with many rights-based limitations on government power,
the government can surmount the prohibition on its regulation of speech in a public
forum even based on content by satisfying the demanding “strict scrutiny” test, which
requires that the government establish a compelling government interest in regulating the
speech and that the regulation in question is narrowly tailored to the government’s
interest. Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 1984.
83
Id. at 1984-85.
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the forum” and viewpoint neutral, though there is some
indication that the Court may be especially stringent in
examining viewpoint neutrality if religious viewpoints are
involved. Finally, when a State opens a public forum but
excludes a speaker whose speech obviously falls within the
subject matter constraints of the forum, the exclusion is
subject to strict scrutiny.84
Finally, a closed or non-public forum is a similar piece of property that
the government has not opened up to the public for debate on any topic.
In such a forum, the government-as-property-owner’s power to select and
exclude speakers is paramount, and the government may exclude most
speakers and even most potential listeners, as long as such exclusions are
reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum, and as long as it does not
exclude them on the grounds that it disfavors their viewpoints.85 The
leading case recognizing such a closed forum is Perry Education
Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, in which the Court
held the faculty mail system to be closed to a rival teacher’s union, even
though it was opened to communications from the then-current bargaining
representative.86
Intuitively, the classroom most appropriately fits within the concept of
the closed or nonpublic forum, because it is well accepted that the
government need not permit any speakers within the classroom other than
the students, teachers, and school personnel who generally occupy it.87
But, as to both teachers and students as speakers, the classroom manifestly
does not follow the rules of that forum.88 To understand why, we must
examine the different doctrinal limitations that apply in the classroom to
teachers and students as speakers.

84

Id. at 1988-89 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1989.
86
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
87
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (comparing the student
newspaper at issue in that case with the classroom and justifying content and viewpoint
restrictions based on “legitimate pedagogical concerns” in both).
88
Contrariwise, the overall school environment (hallways, athletic fields, etc.) outside of
class and co-curricular activities operates more like a limited public forum, limited to
certain participants, but not to certain topics of conversation or viewpoints. See Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
85
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The Teacher as a First Amendment Speaker
Teachers and administrators are simultaneously: 1) Employees, who
often must speak to fulfill their contractual employment duties; (2)
Citizens, who may speak responsibly on matters of public concern; 89 and
3) Embodiments of “the State,” which the Constitution disables from
acting to limit the rights of the other participants in the marketplace of
ideas.90 Like all public employees, public school teachers maintain their
basic constitutional rights despite their status as government employees.
Under the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine, a public entity may not
condition the provision of a public benefit—including public
employment—on one’s relinquishment of a constitutional right.91
Nevertheless, courts have permitted the government, acting in its role
as employer, to limit public educational employees’ speech that would
otherwise be protected in a non-employment setting.92 In most cases,
these limitations have sought to protect interests similar to those served by
limits on student speech, often centering on concerns of pedagogical
effectiveness and school managerial interests.93 Until recently, such
limitations have largely emerged through case-by-case analysis, rather
than through categorical rules. However, the Court’s recent decision in
Garcetti, discussed above, introduced the categorical rule completely
excluding job-required speech from the First Amendment’s protections,
89

See generally NELDA H. CAMBRON-MCCABE, MARTHA M. MCCARTHY, & STEPHEN B.
THOMAS, LEGAL RIGHTS OF TEACHERS AND STUDENTS 228-39 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing
teacher rights to free expression).
90
See id. at 93 (discussing the “state action” doctrine in schools).
91
See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (holding that a public
university cannot condition employment as a professor on the professor’s signing of a
“Loyalty Oath”); Kathleen A. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1413, 1415 (1989) (outlining the state of the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine). But
see Secunda, Right-Privilege, supra note 6, at 912 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s line
of decisions in Pickering, Connick, and Garcetti have weakened the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine to the point of near obliteration).
92
See Williams v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 690-691 (5th Cir. 2007); Mayer
v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Co., 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007); Brammer-Hoelter v.
Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192 (5th Cir. 2007).
93
See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir. 1998)
(“We agree with Plato and Burke and Justice Frankfurter that the school, not the teacher,
has the right to fix the curriculum”); see also Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First
Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (2008) (arguing
that Garcetti is the latest in a series of Supreme Court decisions elevating “managerial
prerogative” to constitutional status).
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regardless of its content or viewpoint.94
Read on its own literal terms, the Garcetti rule would plainly bring
within its ambit all of the pedagogical and scholarly academic speech of
public school teachers. Speaking of the analogous case of public
university professors, Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent:
This ostensible domain beyond the pale of the First
Amendment is spacious enough to include even the
teaching of a public university professor, and I have to
hope that today’s majority does not mean to imperil First
Amendment protection of academic freedom in public
colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak
and write “pursuant to . . . official duties.”95
In response to Justice Souter’s concerns about the teaching and
scholarship of higher education academics, Justice Kennedy hedged:
There is some argument that expression related to academic
scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by
this Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence.
We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the
analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner
to a case involving speech related to scholarship or
teaching.96
Nevertheless, whatever Justice Kennedy meant in response to Justice
Souter’s concern, it is clear that the terms of the Garcetti exclusion apply
squarely to the expression of public school teachers in the classroom.
Teachers in the classroom, at least while delivering curricular content,
managing student behavior, and responding to questions about the
material, always speak “pursuant to their official duties.”
The Garcetti rule, recall, does not contain any exception for the
suppression or punishment of speech based on its content or even its
viewpoint. If it is speech made pursuant to an official duty to speak, it is
categorically unprotected. This means that the classroom, at least for
teachers, lacks the protections of even a closed or nonpublic forum (the
94

See supra notes 46-65 (discussing Garcetti).
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 438 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
96
Id. at 425.
95
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forum category it is typically assumed to occupy) because even a closed or
nonpublic forum requires that excluding or silencing a speaker due to
disagreement with his viewpoint be justified by strict scrutiny. 97 In fact,
teacher speech in the classroom occupies a status equivalent to “lowvalue” speech, such as speech inciting a riot, or child pornography, which
also receive no protection, regardless of viewpoint.98 Based on this
reading, then, it would seem that, rather than a closed or nonpublic forum,
the classroom is a zone of no protection when it comes to teacher speech.99
As an illustration, in Mayer v. Monroe County Community School
Corporation,100 the Seventh Circuit heard the case of a probationary
elementary school teacher whose contract was not renewed after she
answered a question from a student in her class. In a current events
lesson, Mayer was discussing political protests. In response to a student’s
question whether Mayer had personally participated in a political
demonstration, Mayer said that she did honk her car horn when passing a
placard that read “Honk for Peace” during the second Iraq War.101
After the school district declined to renew her contract, Mayer sued for
retaliation, citing this in-class expression as the basis. During the course
of the suit, Mayer stipulated that speaking on current events was one of
her official duties, and she rested her hopes entirely on the principles of
academic freedom in seeking the First Amendment’s protection. 102 This
stipulation made the Seventh Circuit’s decision on the threshold question
easy—if speaking to her students on the topic of current events was one of
her official duties, then her statements made during the current events
lesson in question constituted speech “pursuant to” such duties.103
However, Mayer contended that the Garcetti rule does not control
97

See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 57.
See Bauries & Schach, supra note 10, at 358, n.5.
99
Professor Alan Brownstein proposes and defends the new concept of the “nonforum”
as the category that should govern speech in schools and at school-sponsored functions.
See Brownstein, supra note 1. This proposed new forum category, which immunizes
speech from any judicial review, governs student, rather than teacher, speech, but it is
analogous to the complete lack of protection for teacher classroom speech under current
doctrine.
100
474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007).
101
Mayer, 474 F.3d 478.
102
Id. at 479. Based on the Seventh Circuit’s traditional approach to the topic and the
lack of helpful precedent from the Supreme Court, see generally Bauries, supra note 12,
Ms. Mayer’s legal strategy to rely on academic freedom was likely a mistake, and a better
approach would have been to contest the compulsory nature of her current events lesson.
103
Id. at 480.
98
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classroom speech.104
The court rejected this contention. The Seventh Circuit has historically
held that classroom teachers do not have the freedom to choose
instructional materials or deliver instruction in ways conflicting with the
wishes of their supervisors.105 Building from this existing rule, the court
explained that “the school system does not ‘regulate’ teachers’ speech as
much as it hires that speech.”106 The court described a teacher’s
classroom speech as a “commodity” that the teacher “sells” to the school
district, and explained that, as such, a teacher of history may not contradict
his district’s wishes by engaging in revisionist instruction, and a teacher of
math may not elect on her own to teach calculus instead of
trigonometry.107 The court also pointed out that, unlike in most employee
speech cases, K-12 teachers address their speech to a captive audience, a
fact which necessitates that curricular and pedagogical decisional authority
rest with those who may be voted out of office for poor decisions.108
Similarly, in Evans-Marshall v. Board of Education,109 the Sixth
Circuit considered the claim of a high school English teacher who had
experienced negative reactions—first from the community, then from the
Board of Education, and finally from her principal—regarding her book
choices and the pedagogical strategies that she used in relation to the
books.110 Ultimately, the Board voted unanimously not to renew the
teacher’s contract, and the teacher sued, alleging unconstitutional
interference with and retaliation for her exercise of an alleged right “to
select books and methods of instruction for use in the classroom without
interference from public officials.”111 When the case reached the Sixth
Circuit, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Garcetti should not
104

Id. at 479.
See id. (citing Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir.
1990) (holding that a classroom teacher did not possess a right to teach his students that
the Earth was thousands, rather than billions, of years old).
106
Id. (emphasis in original).
107
Id. (“A teacher hired to lead a social-studies class can't use it as a platform for a
revisionist perspective that Benedict Arnold wasn't really a traitor, when the approved
program calls him one; a high-school teacher hired to explicate Moby-Dick in a literature
class can't use Cry, The Beloved Country instead, even if Paton's book better suits the
instructor's style and point of view; a math teacher can't decide that calculus is more
important than trigonometry and decide to let Hipparchus and Ptolemy slide in favor of
Newton and Leibniz”).
108
Id. at 479-80.
109
428 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2010).
110
Id. at 223-26.
111
Id. at 223.
105
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be held applicable because of the Supreme Court’s failure to squarely
address the issue.112 The court acknowledged that the exchange between
Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter in the Garcetti opinion left open the
application of the Garcetti rule to certain academic speech, but that K-12
classroom teaching is not among this speech.113 The court ultimately held
that classroom teaching and expressive pedagogical choices, as speech
made “pursuant to official duties,” are unprotected under the First
Amendment.114
The Student as a First Amendment Speaker
Students are certainly citizens with speech rights, but they are also
public charges, such that their speech rights may be limited for their own
protection, as well as for the protection of other students engaged in the
educational process alongside them.115 It is a familiar axiom that students
do not completely “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”116 Nevertheless, as discussed above,
First Amendment doctrine holds that student speech in public educational
settings does not demand the same constitutional protections that similar
speech made in open public forums would require.117
As discussed above, it is most plausible that, due to the Court’s
categorical determination that curricular activities, including activities in
the classroom, are part of a closed or nonpublic forum, Hazelwood, rather
112

Id. at 233-34.
Id.
114
Id. at 230.
115
See, e.g., Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua Cnty., 324 F.3d 1246, 1247 (11th Cir. 2003)
(“Although public school students’ First Amendment rights are not forfeited at the school
door, those rights should not interfere with a school administrator's professional
observation that certain expressions have led to, and therefore could lead to, an unhealthy
and potentially unsafe learning environment for the children they serve”); CAMBRONMCCABE, MCCARTHY, & THOMAS, supra note 89, at 94-107 (discussing student rights to
free expression). Prof. Brownstein calls into question this “reduced rights” paradigm,
and he is correct as he frames the comparison—which is one between adult speech in
closed forums and student speech outside the classroom in school or at school-sponsored
functions. See Brownstein, supra note 1, at 729-42. But in the classroom, where the
speech of students can clearly be restricted based on its viewpoint even absent a
“compelling government interest” and “narrowly tailored means,” students certainly have
less expansive rights than adults do in any forum they might occupy, even a closed
forum.
116
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
117
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986); Morse v. Frederick,
551 U.S. 393, 396-397 (2007).
113
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than Tinker, governs student expression in the classroom. Within this
paradigm, since the Hazelwood case was decided, commentators have
puzzled over whether the Court intended to approve viewpoint
discrimination by schools and school officials in curricular settings. A
close reading of the decision, including the way the majority chose to
frame its holding, as well as the evidence at issue in the case, make the
contrary case difficult to support.118
Based on the facts before the Court, the way in which the Court
developed its holding, and the most natural implications of the ruling, it is
clear that the Hazelwood rule allows for viewpoint discrimination. Most
basically, this rule construed this way simply makes sense. A teacher
cannot be compelled to allow a student, during an open class discussion of
World War II, to deliver a Holocaust denial diatribe, for example, even
though telling him to sit down and shut up would qualify as classic
viewpoint discrimination.119 If the Hazelwood rule would not permit that
sort of censorship, then what rule would? The student in this hypothetical
is participating in an open class discussion, so his expression of his
viewpoint cannot be said to be materially and substantially disruptive of
the learning environment, in the Tinker sense. Indeed, his contribution,
though disturbing and manifestly incorrect, is on point, providing the
teacher with one of those “teachable moments” that engage the dialectical
classroom process. He also offers his own unvarnished opinion, so his
expression cannot be plausibly characterized as “government speech.”120
The Hazelwood rule is all that remains that might allow for the teacher to
simply tell the student he is not permitted to express such an opinion on
this point—an action that is perfectly defensible, and may be quite
118

See Zouhary, supra note 1, at 2252-53 (outlining several reasons, including the text of
the Court’s holding, that Hazelwood authorized viewpoint discrimination); R. George
Wright, School-Sponsored Speech and the Surprising Case for Viewpoint-Based
Regulations, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 175, 186 (2007) (concluding that Hazelwood’s language
compels this conclusion); Samuel P. Jordan, Viewpoint Restrictions and SchoolSponsored Student Speech: Avenues for Heightened Protection, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1555,
1556 (2003) (“If a constitutional exception permitting restrictions on student points of
view is not compelled by Hazelwood, it is at least arguably consistent with a fair reading
of the decision”).
119
See Waldman, supra note 3, at 66 (“The real question is not whether Hazelwood
permits viewpoint discrimination, but when”) (emphasis in original); see also Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (holding that
governmental restrictions on speech and speakers in even closed forums must be
“viewpoint-neutral”).
120
Brownstein, supra note 1, at 751. When expression is considered to be the
government’s own expression, the general prohibition against content and viewpoint
discrimination does not apply. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
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necessary, from a pedagogical standpoint to prevent the other students
from becoming sympathetic to an idea that has no empirical or historical
support, or at least to teach students to distinguish between historical facts
and unfounded conspiracy theories.
Other than this common sense reading, vital elements of Hazelwood
itself indicate that the Court knew it was approving a rule that would allow
for viewpoint discrimination for pedagogical reasons. For example, the
viewpoint discrimination question came up frequently at oral argument.121
Justice Scalia engaged in a lengthy interrogation of the plaintiffs’ counsel
as to how a school might be able to maintain a newspaper at all with any
editorial discretion if viewpoint discrimination were prohibited.122 The
dissent also focused on it as a stated concern.123 That the majority opinion
did not specifically approve viewpoint discrimination may have been a
matter of cobbling together a majority.124
Nevertheless, Justice White’s illustrative list of the speech a school
could legitimately suppress under the Court’s rule ought to have laid to
rest any doubts about viewpoint discrimination in the classroom:
Hence, a school may in its capacity as publisher of a school
newspaper or producer of a school play disassociate itself,
not only from speech that would “substantially interfere
with its work or impinge upon the rights of other students,”
but also from speech that is, for example, ungrammatical,
poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or
prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature
audiences. . . . In addition, a school must be able to take
into account the emotional maturity of the intended
audience in determining whether to disseminate student
speech on potentially sensitive topics, which might range
from the existence of Santa Claus in an elementary school
setting to the particulars of teenage sexual activity in a high
school setting. A school must also retain the authority to
refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be
perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible
sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with the shared
121
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values of a civilized social order, or to associate the school
with any position other than neutrality on matters of
political controversy.125
Several of these items clearly involve the school selecting between
differing viewpoints, and most of them plausibly could involve such
choosing under the right circumstances.
The classroom speech cases decided since Hazelwood, most of which
involve student religious speech, also bear out this interpretation. For
example, in Peck v. Baldwinsville Central School District, students were
given an assignment to create a poster illustrating ways in which the
environment could be protected. One student chose to include prayer as
one of these ways, and her poster contained a picture of Jesus Christ. The
school chose to display her poster, but to obscure the picture of Jesus. The
Second Circuit held that the school had a “legitimate pedagogical interest”
in preventing the impression that the school was sponsoring religion, and
upheld the censorship.126
Similarly, in C.H. v. Oliva,127 the Third Circuit held that it was
permissible for a school to censor a student’s religious viewpoints
expressed in two school assignments. One was a poster assignment asking
students to represent things they were thankful for (the student listed
“Jesus” among those things), and the other was a class reading assignment
to bring in a story from home to read to the other students (the student
brought in the story of Jacob and Esau from the Old Testament). In both
cases, the school was permitted to remove the student’s references to
religious content and expressions of his religious viewpoint from the view
and hearing of the other students.
But, if viewpoint discrimination as to classroom and other curricular
speech is indeed permitted under Hazelwood, then we should consider
whether the Hazelwood rule should be the final word, or whether the
apparent confusion about viewpoint discrimination has prevented us from
developing rules of application for Hazelwood that would value First
Amendment interests more, while protecting school interests as they
require. The commentators and courts rejecting the reading of Hazelwood
outlined above do so mainly because they are concerned about the
marketplace of ideas, both as a valuable thing in and of itself and as a
125
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teaching model for students learning to be democratic citizens.128 The
traditional prescription for speech that expresses an indefensible viewpoint
encourages “more speech.”129 In this view, carving out classroom and
curricular speech as a unique category of speech that does not benefit from
the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination is unwise and counter to
the general principles of the First Amendment.130
However, the First Amendment is riddled with categories of speech
that receive no protection, even from viewpoint discrimination. Lowvalue speech,131 the job-required speech of public employees,132 and
government speech133 are all categories of speech that do not observe the
rule against viewpoint discrimination. Even pure political speech
expressed in a traditional public forum can be suppressed based on its
viewpoint if the government can meet the strict scrutiny standard.134 So,
while the presumptive prohibition against viewpoint discrimination is real,
it is by no means an immutable command of the First Amendment, and the
failure to observe it in the classroom, and in school activities that mimic
the classroom, is both defensible under Hazelwood and Garcetti and
pedagogically inevitable in large-scale public schooling environments.
The Limits of the Current Doctrine
The real question, then, is whether Hazelwood should be the entirety of
speech doctrine for students in the classroom, and whether Garcetti should
be the entirety of speech doctrine for teachers in the classroom. While
Hazelwood itself seems to refute the proponents of a strong prohibition
against viewpoint discrimination in the classroom, they are certainly
correct that students being educated in a democratic society should be able
128
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to benefit from acting in a democratic fashion, part of which involves
offering and defending opinions and debating ideas. Hazelwood shows us
that schools have a legitimate interest in taking some ideas and some
matters of debate off the table, but that does not mean that schools and
school officials have been given license to act without any responsibility.
Similar to the speech of teachers, the speech of students in the classroom
and in co-curricular activities does require some breathing space, even
acknowledging the strong interests of schools in saying which “ideas” are
“false.”135
Below, I outline a slight alteration to the doctrines of classroom speech,
which is justified (as are the restrictive protections that prevail in schools)
by the unique culturally inculcative and custodial conditions of the school
environment, but which balances both control and freedom in a way
superior to current doctrine. The rule I propose works within the
categorical structure of current First Amendment doctrine, but without
creating any new or unwieldy categories. It also works within a
reasonable interpretation of the two prevailing cases that currently govern
speech in the classroom, Garcetti and Hazelwood, as well as their
classroom speech progeny, so implementing it does not require any action
from the Supreme Court to overrule those cases. We might describe the
proposed rule as a rule of “benign prior restraint.”
Developing a Workable Classroom Speech Doctrine
Living Within the Categorical Approach
The First Amendment’s basic right (a general speech right which can
be limited only based on a justification that would pass strict scrutiny) is
decidedly standard-based, but each of the exceptions and augmentations to
it introduces some element of categorical analysis. As others have pointed
out, this tendency to think of speech as a set of categories negatively
impacts the marketplace of ideas.136 Nevertheless, we are far along that
road now, and it makes the most sense at this point to attempt to derive
doctrine that can work within the categorical approach, at least until the
next shift occurs in the Court’s thinking.
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Accordingly, a successful approach to classroom speech must work
within the categorical approach. Below, I outline a small modification to
the doctrines surrounding the classroom speech of both teachers and
students. This modification might be termed a rule of “benign prior
restraint.” I propose to make the standard of protection depend on
whether the school or school official’s action in regulating such speech
takes the form of a prior restraint or a purely post-speech punishment.
This rule can be derived from the language of Garcetti, Hazelwood, and
their progeny, and it comports well with the need to categorically balance
the legitimate interests of schools and school officials in enforcing a
certain curricular orthodoxy with the legitimate interests of both teachers
and students as members of a democratic society, while also preventing
undue restraint on the expressive interests of teachers and students as
individual speakers.
A Benign Prior Restraint Rule for Classroom Speech
Many scholars and courts have attempted, both before and since
Garcetti and Hazelwood, to find a way to construct the doctrine of the
First Amendment to allow legitimate debate and commentary in
classrooms, where, after all, teachers should be modeling what it means to
be a participant in a democratic republic; while also leaving copious space
for the legitimate regulation of classroom content by those we have—by
vote or delegation—placed in charge of the administration of our schools
and their curriculum. In the next section, I review two representative
efforts before moving on to my own proposal, which draws substantially
from these accounts.
Benign Prior Restraint and the Classroom Speech of Teachers.
In recent years, numerous commentators have attempted to flesh out a
workable doctrine of public school teacher speech protection.137 Of these,
two accounts in particular stand out as well-argued and defensible under
137
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current standards—one authored prior to the Court’s decision in Garcetti
and the other authored a few years after it. Like the rule proposed in this
article, both of these accounts propose that we make speech protections for
teachers depend in part on concepts of prior notice.
Beginning with the former, Professor Kevin Welner, perhaps predicting
the eventual development of a Garcetti-type rule in the Supreme Court,
advanced the claim in 2003 that the punishment of teacher speech made in
the classroom should depend on elements of notice.138 Because Welner’s
paper was authored pre-Garcetti, it is understandable that, in the main, it
states an alternative to the “superficial” applications of Hazelwood to
teacher classroom speech offered by some courts at that time.139
Accordingly, even on its own terms, it requires some reconsideration and
augmentation in light of the much more stringent Garcetti complete
exclusion of the job-required speech of teachers from the protection of the
First Amendment.
Welner’s approach to notice takes as its main unit of analysis the
teacher seeking to make methodological or pedagogical decisions—
decisions as to how to deliver course content. The Hazelwood progeny
cases that Welner critiques fail to protect these teachers’ discretion
because that discretion is nearly always overridden by the discretion of the
school administrators in establishing the curriculum of the school.
Welner’s idea is that the teacher’s discretion should be overridden in this
way only if the school is the type that explicitly treats its teachers as
“ministerial” employees who are not empowered to exercise pedagogical
discretion.140 Absent such a policy, Welner argues, teachers should have
the presumptive right to exercise their professional discretion in how they
deliver their lessons.
There is an obvious appeal to Welner’s proposed approach. A
presumption that teachers are imbued with pedagogical discretion,
rebutted only though a pre-communicated policy to the contrary, would be
a useful rule. But today, it would seem that Garcetti would stand in the
way of such a presumption, at least as applied to the selection of curricular
materials and the delivery of the actual lesson. It is hard to imagine that
teachers have any First Amendment claim to discretion over these matters
after Garcetti. As the Sixth Circuit stated in reluctantly applying Garcetti
138
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to the book selection decisions of a high school English teacher:
As with any other individual in the community, [the
teacher] had no more free-speech right to dictate the
school’s curriculum than she had to obtain a platform—a
teaching position—in the first instance for communicating
her preferred list of books and teaching methods. ‘[N]o
relevant analogue’ exists between her in-class curricular
speech and speech by private citizens.141
This is true, the court said, “even if it otherwise appears (at least on
summary judgment) that the school administrators treated her shabbily.”142
However, even under this post-Garcetti framework, it is not inevitable
that a teacher cannot ever be a First Amendment speaker in the classroom,
for example, when she speaks in ways that do not constitute delivering an
actual lesson or selecting curricular materials. And even under Garcetti,
the court is required to engage in a searching review of what the
employee’s “official duties” actually were, remaining skeptical of overly
broad job descriptions and policy manuals. Accordingly, some room
remains for a notice-based approach to the application of Garcetti that
draws from Welner’s prescient work.
In a well-argued, post-Garcetti student note, Kimberly Gee develops a
proposed rule that depends on prior notice, as well. Despite her note
having been authored post-Garcetti, however, Gee’s proposal also works
entirely within the Hazelwood teacher speech paradigm. Gee proposes, as
part of what she terms a “modified Hazelwood test,” that we allow the
application of the Hazelwood “legitimate pedagogical interest” test to
govern teacher speech only where the school or district has predetermined
that the classroom is a “closed forum.”143
And even in such
circumstances, “teachers should not be disciplined for violating
regulations, even if they are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns, when the schools fail to put them on notice that such regulations
exist and apply to the conduct at hand.”144 Gee’s proposal has significant
merit, as it balances the liberty interests of teachers with the power
interests of government educational authorities and attempts to find a way
141
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to allow both interests to operate within their legitimate space. However,
a few problems exist that counsel a different approach.
First, Gee gives somewhat short shrift to the importance of Garcetti to
the classroom speech rights of teachers. Based on the reticence of the
federal courts in applying Pickering’s “matter of public concern” prong to
classroom speech, along with the Seventh Circuit’s then-recent decision in
Mayer applying Garcetti to classroom speech, Gee concludes that a
Hazelwood-based approach, rather than Garcetti, would govern any First
Amendment question in the classroom, at least where the district or school
treats the classroom as a closed forum.145
But this conclusion elides the clear rule stated in Garcetti that public
employees cannot claim First Amendment protection for any speech they
utter “pursuant to official duties.”146 Although dicta in the Garcetti
decision disclaims any intent on the Court’s part to address the rule’s
application to academic speech,147 the Garcetti rule nevertheless squarely
applies to classroom speech on its own terms. A teacher’s classroom
speech is certainly speech made “pursuant to official duties.” No
persuasive case has yet been made that teachers are not speaking
“pursuant to official duties” when they teach, so any distinguishing of
Garcetti in the context of the classroom must rely on some sort of special
constitutional status that teachers hold. Although there exists some
common perception that this is so, the Supreme Court has never so held,
and it is not likely to so hold in the future.148
Gee makes an admirable effort to identify a special constitutional status
for teachers that would counsel against applying Pickering (and by
extension, Garcetti) to classroom speech, arguing:
Pickering’s division of speech into public and private
realms makes sense for general government employees,
given the authority of the state, as an employer, to ensure
the efficiency of services provided through its employees.
However, teachers are unlike other state employees in that
145
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their employment as educators is always a matter of public
concern. Other government employees are not asked to
teach lessons that are sufficiently creative to hold students’
attention while adhering to state mandated educational
guidelines, to foster an environment where students are
excited about learning, or to introduce students to a world
of diverse people, customs, values, and ideas. The
Pickering test has not been tailored to address the particular
necessities of teaching. The classroom truly is a sui generis
environment, and courts that apply Pickering to in-class
teacher speech cases effectively ignore teachers’ unique
role in society, to the disservice of everyone with an
interest in the public school system.149
But are these distinctions really of much constitutional significance? And
are they even real distinctions? First, is the employment of any other class
of public employees not a “matter of public concern”? We constantly
debate efficiency and effectiveness in government, and that debate impacts
the employment of every person whose livelihood depends on public
funding and public needs. That teachers are among the more sympathetic
public employees, and among the more familiar to the average citizen,
does not necessarily make their jobs any more a matter of public concern
than, say, the typical firefighter or police officer.
Second, it is not clear why the specific job duties of teachers should
counsel for a different approach or a special set of rights under the First
Amendment, as compared with the duties of other public employees. Gee
argues that teaching is expressive and creative work, and that the
expression in question is governed by publicly derived goals, limits, and
expectations, as well as by the discretion of the teacher, but so are
lawyering, auditing, speech writing, and leading tour groups in our
national parks, all of which are done by public employees, and all of
which involve some discretion on the part of the employee in framing the
expression. Right or wrong, the Garcetti rule says that, when a public
employee speaks pursuant to an official duty, it makes no difference
whether the employee’s speech resulted from reasonable expressive
choices—only whether it was made pursuant to an official duty to speak
matters. As to this point, it is hard to see why teachers should be treated
any differently, and cases decided since the publication of Gee’s note
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confirm this conclusion.150
Nevertheless, it is certainly true that the classroom work environment
differs from the work environment of most public employees in that it is
not only expressive, but also often spontaneous. Good teachers look for
“teachable moments” and may adjust their speech on the fly in response to
such moments based on their own professional judgment. Just as it would
be unfair to judge the action of a police officer which turns out later to
have been a violation of the Constitution based on a standard of which the
officer could not have been aware at the time,151 it would be the height of
unfairness to revoke a teacher’s First Amendment protections because the
teacher uttered speech that later was determined to be in conflict with a
job duty of which the teacher could not have been precisely aware at the
time. So, both Welner and Gee are certainly correct that the proper
approach should be based on elements of notice (or at least constructive
notice), and that ex post facto “official duties” not to speak should not be
the basis for regulating teacher classroom speech.
But to succeed, any solution must work within the categorical approach
to employee speech that the Supreme Court obviously favors and shows
no sign of jettisoning.152 If a teacher cannot claim First Amendment
protection over speech she utters “pursuant to [her] official duties,” then
what is necessary to bring speech under this standard? Even in Garcetti,
the Court indicated (also in response to the concerns of a dissenter) that
the test for whether speech was made pursuant to official duties should not
be a wooden one, and should be attentive to an employer’s bad-faith or
pretextual designations of speech as being with the job duties of an
employee.153 Courts since then have been especially suspicious of post
hoc justifications for regulating public employee speech, as such post hoc
justifications presumptively come from a place of rationalizing an
otherwise unconstitutional decision, rather than from a place of effectively
150
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and efficiently regulating a public workplace.154
This attentiveness to bad-faith, pretextual, and post hoc designation of
duties related to speech counsels in favor of the kinds of notice-based
approaches favored by both Welner and Gee; but the Court’s consistent
favoring of categorical approaches to speech also counsels in favor of
working within that paradigm. As discussed above, as a constitutional
matter, teachers are really no different from other public employees, many
of whom fulfill roles that pervasively concern the public and many of
whom perform expressive work on behalf of public entities, while also
exercising discretion regarding that work. But we may say that it is well
within the rule of Garcetti to require courts to identify a specific set of
employment duties (not general expectations) that governed a teacher’s
speech on the date in question in the suit before applying the Garcetti
exclusion, and to exhibit a healthy and searching skepticism as to any
showing that an employer-defendant makes on such grounds.
If this is the case, then it is only a small step, and one entirely within
the parameters of the Garcetti rule, to require that a public educational
employer be able to show that, at the time of the speech in question, there
was either a written policy, an oral directive, or a provable general
understanding among employees, that the speech in question was
prohibited. If this is the case, then the Garcetti exclusion should apply. If
not, then the court should revert to the Pickering analysis.
Although reasonable minds may dispute whether a public employee
can speak simultaneously as a citizen and as an employee pursuant to a job
duty,155 the Court has resolved this question in favor of employees’ being
able to occupy only one of these roles at a time when expressing
themselves. But that does not mean that when a public employee
speaks—even on the job—every word uttered is uttered pursuant to an
official duty. Different jobs require—and prohibit—different amounts and
kinds of speech, and the Garcetti rule acknowledges this fact.
Indeed, the Garcetti Court citied approvingly and reaffirmed Givhan v.
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Western Line Consolidated School District,156 a case in which a
unanimous Court held to be protected under the First Amendment a school
guidance counselor’s complaints during the work day to her superiors
regarding alleged racial bias that she had perceived in hiring at the
school.157 Although Ms. Givhan spoke at work, during work hours, and to
her superiors about work-related matters, her speech was protected
because it embraced a matter of public concern.
The Garcetti Court did not see fit to overrule that decision on the way
to stating its holding; rather, it used Givhan as a foil to show a contrast
with the plaintiff, Ceballos’, expression, which took the form of a legal
memorandum authored by an attorney employed in part to author legal
memoranda. The natural implication of this use of Givhan is that not
everything that one says at work or even about work is said to be pursuant
to one’s official duties, even if one is employed in an expressive role, as
every school guidance counselor certainly is. Therefore, every potential
Garcetti case requires courts to distinguish between job-required or jobprohibited speech on one hand, and speech made while at work, but not
required or prohibited by a job duty on the other hand.
In the classroom, this task is fairly simple, but certainly not pro forma.
Although it would be useful to have data on this point, it is safe to assume
that the vast majority of public school teacher expression in the classroom
involves delivering content based on the approved school curriculum and
the materials purchased in support of it; managing student behavior; and
responding to student questions relating to the course material. As to
these matters, it is obvious that Garcetti would govern because every
public school teacher is specifically employed to deliver the approved
curricular content using the approved curricular materials, and is expected
to manage student behavior and respond to student questions about the
material. But that sort of expression is also certainly not the only
classroom expression in which a teacher engages. And more importantly,
it is not always clear to a teacher in the classroom just what the approved
curriculum requires him to say or not say, or just what the expectations of
his school, district or profession allow him to say while managing student
behavior, or just which questions from students he may answer and how
she may or may not frame such an answer.
Because much of what is said in the classroom is difficult to connect to
the specific requirements and prohibitions of the job, courts should tread
carefully when seeking to employ Garcetti’s “pursuant to official duties”
156
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test, and it would be helpful to have a way to distinguish between jobrequired or job-prohibited speech and other speech made in the classroom
that comports with the overall categorical structure of First Amendment
jurisprudence. In prior work, a co-author and I advanced the claim that,
given the narrowness of the Court’s holding and the care with which
Justice Kennedy distinguished Ceballos’ speech from that of the plaintiffs
in Pickering and Givhan, the Garcetti “pursuant to official duties” test
should not be satisfied unless, at the time of the challenged expression, the
employee in question would have been legitimately subject to discipline
under his employment contract for failing to speak.158 But it became clear
to me after the publication of that work that this test, while useful, can
only take the courts so far. For example, it would not have worked as
intended in the case of Ms. Mayer, who was disciplined for answering a
student’s question on her own participation in protests. That discipline
was upheld under the Garcetti test because the district claimed that, in
effect, a requirement not to answer that question was an official,
expressive duty of Mayer’s job.159
In other words, the flaw in my past work on this topic was in failing to
recognize that a duty not to speak, in many cases, is the “official duty” that
the district claims the employee spoke “pursuant to.” Thus, the test I
articulated in my past work needs an update, and that update should also
address other types of unarticulated purported “duties” to speak in a
certain way that serve as post hoc justifications in some cases for
retaliatory punishments.160 The work of the courts since Garcetti was
decided, including the Supreme Court, provides a way forward.
In particular, the case of Lane v. Franks, decided in 2014, illustrates
that the Court views the Garcetti rule as narrow and limited to facts that
are very similar to the facts of Garcetti. Lane involved the trial testimony
of a former community college administrator who had discovered that one
of his subordinates was illegally drawing a paycheck from his federallyfunded program without doing much, if any, work.161 He fired the
subordinate, who was (unfortunately for Lane) an influential sitting
member of the Alabama Legislature, and she allegedly vowed retaliation.
After Lane testified against her in a federal criminal trial, that promised
retaliation allegedly came when everyone in his department was laid off,
and all were rehired thereafter except Lane.
158

See Bauries & Schach, supra note 10.
See Mayer v. Monroe, 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007).
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See Evans-Marshall v. Board of Educ., 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2011).
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Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2375 (2014).
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In the First Amendment retaliation case that resulted, Lane claimed that
he had been fired in direct retaliation for his testimony. The Eleventh
Circuit held that Lane’s testimony was speech made “pursuant to [Lane’s]
official duties” because (drawing from an unfortunate dictum in Justice
Kennedy’s Garcetti opinion) it “owed its existence” to Lane’s public
employment.162 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.163
In rejecting the holding of the Eleventh Circuit, the Court easily
concluded, both in its main opinion and in a more concise concurring
opinion authored by Justice Thomas, that testifying truthfully in a judicial
proceeding was not even arguably one of Lane’s “ordinary job
responsibilities” as a community college administrator.164 The Court also
forcefully rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s “but for” test, which was based
on the “owes its existence” dictum from Garcetti,165 explaining that no
party had suggested that Lane’s job required him to testify in criminal
trials.166
The interesting aspect of Lane, as compared with Garcetti, is the
introduction of the word “ordinary” to the words “official duties” or “job
responsibilities” expressed within the Garcetti holding.167 As at least one
circuit court has recognized the addition of this adjective, which the
Court’s main opinion repeated nine times, and which even the brief
concurrence of Justice Thomas repeated another three times, and that it
was likely deliberate, and most plausibly clarifies the truly narrow nature
of the Garcetti exclusion.168
In Lane, the use of this phrasing obviously was meant to highlight that
Lane was not hired as a “professional witness.” He was an educational
162

Lane v. Franks, 523 Fed. App’x 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Garcetti for the
“owe[d] its existence” quote in support). My prior work has identified this dictum, along
with a few others, as introducing regrettable ambiguity to the Garcetti rule, and
muddying the waters sufficiently to allow a great deal of mischief in the lower courts.
See generally Bauries & Schach, supra note 10.
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Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2369.
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Id. at 2375.
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See Lane, 523 Fed. App’x at 711.
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Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379.
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I am indebted to Professors Brenda Kallio and Richard Geisel for drawing my
attention to the Court’s repeated use of this word during their presentation of their workin-progress, Exploring the Boundaries of First Amendment Protection for Expressions on
Matters of Public Concern by School Personnel, at the Annual Meeting of the Education
Law Association in 2014.
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See Mpoy v. Rhee, 758 F.3d 285, 295 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“In particular, the use of the
adjective “ordinary”—which the court repeated nine times—could signal a narrowing of
the realm of employee speech left unprotected by Garcetti”).
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administrator whose duty to testify arose only as a result of circumstances
that could not have been predicted. “Ordinarily,” in other words, he
would not have had any official duty to testify, so his expression in
offering his testimony remained protected from post hoc punishment.
Applied to the classroom context, this clarified conception of the
Garcetti exclusion suggests that prior restraint can serve a benign role in
relation to teacher classroom speech. Under this approach, teachers
performing their “ordinary” teaching duties—delivering lessons,
communicating with students about the course material, selecting
readings, etc.—would be acting “pursuant to [their] ordinary job
responsibilities” in the overwhelming majority of cases. But in cases such
as Mayer, where a teacher speaks in the classroom spontaneously on a
topic that is ancillary to her delivery of the curriculum or management of
student behavior, the Garcetti exclusion should apply unless she was
given a specific prior directive not to engage in such speech, or there
existed a prior norm of prohibition that would have been known to a
teacher in her circumstances.
Benign Prior Restraint and the Classroom Speech of Students.
In the student speech context, the categorical rule functions differently
from the categorical rule in the teacher speech context. Under Garcetti,
the categorical rule exists to completely remove from the First
Amendment’s protection speech that would otherwise be within its
protection due to its source—the ordinary job duties of the employee.
However, under the student speech precedent, Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier,169
the categorical rule exists to determine the First Amendment forum within
which student speech exists.
Tinker v. Des Moines and its “materially and substantially disrupts” test
applies presumptively to student speech within schools. Courts therefore
presumptively treat schools as limited public forums, limited by the
speakers who are allowed to participate (students and teachers), but
limited in what may be discussed only based on the prevention or
cessation of material and substantial disruption to the school’s operations.
But Hazelwood places an important limitation on that presumptive
classification—where the speech in question occurs in furtherance of a
curricular or co-curricular activity that “bears the imprimatur of the
school” (i.e., is required or authorized by it), school officials may regulate
the speech as long as the regulation in question is “reasonably related to
169

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Because the classroom is always a
curricular venue that bears the school’s imprimatur, courts generally apply
the Hazelwood test to the classroom speech of students,170 and such
application certainly comports with the Hazelwood decision.171
But here again, the Hazelwood test would seem to cross the line from
reasonable in light of school realities, to unreasonable and unfair, where it
is applied in a post hoc manner to silence speech that, while not falling
under any prior restraint in state, district, school, or classroom policy,
happens to offend the individual teacher, the administration, other
students, or some member of the public. Not all student speech—even all
student speech uttered in the classroom—deserves to be placed into the
Hazelwood category. For example, the plaintiffs in Tinker did not remove
their armbands when they entered the classroom,172 and the various
plaintiffs in the many T-shirt cases that have worked their way through the
appellate courts under the Tinker framework have not done so either (until
they were forced to, that is).173 Yet, their speech was either protected or
unprotected based on the disruption it caused or did not cause (or that it
was likely to cause or not cause), not whether the school had “legitimate
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See, e.g., Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271, 277 (3d
Cir. 2003) (relying on Hazelwood in upholding a teacher’s confiscation of pencils that a
student sought to distribute during a classroom holiday party because they contained a
religious message); Settle v. Dickson Cnty. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155-56 (6th Cir. 1995)
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Jesus of Nazareth); id. at 155 (“Where learning is the focus, as in the classroom, student
speech may be even more circumscribed than in the school newspaper or other open
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name of learning and not as a pretext for punishing the student for her race, gender,
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See supra, notes 74-78 and accompanying text (discussing the Hazelwood Court’s
assumption that its standard would apply in the classroom).
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See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 972 (S.D. Iowa
1966) (“After being in their schools for varying lengths of time, each plaintiff was sent
home by school officials for violating the regulation prohibiting the wearing of arm bands
on school premises”).
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See, e.g., Defoe ex rel. Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2010); Boroff v. Van
Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 468, (6th Cir 2000).
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pedagogical concerns” in regulating it.174 Thus, merely entering the
classroom does not have the effect of transforming the student speech
forum—only the additional element of curricular content does.
Thus, in working within the categorical structure of student speech
doctrine, an adapted rule should address the appropriate cases for treating
student classroom speech as though it occurred within the closed
curricular forum that permits even viewpoint discrimination, or the more
open non-curricular school forum that looks skeptically at restrictions
based on both viewpoint and content. Although the student classroom
speech context does not have the benefit of a recent Supreme Court
decision leaning in the direction of Lane’s “ordinary job responsibilities”
formulation, it is possible to derive directly from Hazelwood a similar
formulation, and as in the case of teacher classroom speech, this
formulation suggests that a prior restraint rule can serve a benign role as to
student classroom speech.
In particular, Justice White’s reference, in various forms, to the ideas
that the newspaper at issue in Hazelwood was a “regular classroom
activity,”175 and that the teacher of the Journalism II course ordinarily
exercised supervision over both the content and the format of the articles
in the publication,176 suggests that concepts of notice were embedded
within the Court’s decision. Put another way, the exercise of editorial
control over the class’s newspaper by school officials was not new or
surprising, even though the students objected to how that editorial control
was exercised in the particular case.177
Contrast this with a hypothetical counterfactual. Say the students
working on the paper are instead discussing and brainstorming the idea of
doing a student pregnancy story, and a student sitting nearby who recently
had a miscarriage overhears the discussion and becomes very upset.
Reacting to the upset student’s complaint, the teacher sends the speaking
students to the principal’s office, where they are disciplined for creating a
“hostile work environment.” Because the speech occurs within the
classroom—a quintessential curricular environment—and it is in relation
to curricular goals—selecting story ideas for the upcoming issue—it
would seem that applying the deferential Hazelwood test would seem
174

See, e.g., Defoe, 625 F.3d at 332 (applying Tinker); Boroff, 220 F.3d at 468-69
(same).
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See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 268 (1988).
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See, e.g., id. at 268-69.
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proper here. But without notice that the mere discussion of teen
pregnancy would violate the teacher’s behavioral expectations and lead to
discipline, the punishment of the students would seem unfair.
Nevertheless, the current approach among at least some of the federal
courts to student classroom speech would apply Hazelwood to this
hypothetical because of the obviously curricular nature of the student
speech.178 Under these cases, the fact that the speech occurred in the
classroom and in connection with a curricular activity such as a writing
assignment or class discussion would be enough to settle the categorical
forum question, leading to the application of a more deferential (and
therefore less speech-protective) standard. Such application arguably
would undermine the reasoning of Hazelwood itself, which, recall, placed
importance on the “regular” nature of the official monitoring of content
and expression on the newspaper.
A better approach to the categorical forum question would ask whether
the speech in question would have been perceived by the student speakers
(or hypothetical, reasonable students standing in their shoes) as falling
within some restriction or prohibition deriving from the teacher’s or the
school’s curricular or pedagogical goals or expectations (including student
behavioral expectations). Any such inquiry would have to depend, at least
in part, on whether the speech in question was explicitly prohibited by a
written school or classroom policy, or whether similar speech had led to
discipline for other students in the past.179 Absent such elements of notice,
courts should review the school’s disciplining of the speakers under the
less deferential (and therefore more speech-protective) Tinker standard, as
a small number of decisions have thus far.180
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See, e.g., Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271, 277 (3d
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Conclusion
The augmentation of existing First Amendment standards proposed
here does not seek to remake the landscape of First Amendment doctrine
in the classroom. Nor does it seek to alter the largely categorical approach
to speech protections that exists throughout the First Amendment, and that
clearly draws the support of most of the current Supreme Court.181 Rather,
working within the categorical structure that the Supreme Court has
erected through its decisions in Garcetti and Hazelwood, the proposal set
forth in this article makes the case for appending a limited notice element
to the categorical inquiry that precedes judicial application of the least
speech protective standards that apply to student and teacher speech.
These least protective standards have in several cases been seen as
applicable generally to speech made in the classroom environment,
without regard to any notice that the speakers in question might have had
that their targeted speech would have been subject to discipline or
regulation. Correcting this lack of notice through a benign rule requiring
prior restraints as a precursor to the application of the completely
deferential Garcetti “official duties” exclusion and the very deferential
Hazelwood “legitimate pedagogical concern” test would not solve all of
the problems inherent in those decisions or satisfy their many critics, but
would impose an element of fairness on their application to the ad hoc
punishment and suppression of speech made by teachers and students—
the main participants in the vital and ongoing dialog of the public school
classroom.
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